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ORIGINAL PAPER
France: A Late-Comer to Government–Nonprofit
Partnership
Edith Archambault1
 International Society for Third-Sector Research and The Johns Hopkins University 2015
Abstract This article puts the current cooperative pattern of state-nonprofit rela-
tions in France into historical context against the country’s statist past and suggests
the implications this experience may have for other countries that share the statist
background that France, perhaps in somewhat different form, also embodies. To do
so, the discussion first reviews the current shape of the French nonprofit sector and
the substantial scope and structure of government support of nonprofit human ser-
vice delivery that exists. It then examines the unfavorable historical background out
of which the current arrangements emerged and the set of changes that ultimately
led to the existing pattern of extensive government–nonprofit cooperation. Against
this background, a third section then looks more closely at the tools of action French
governments are bringing to bear in their relations with nonprofits, the advantages
and drawbacks of each, and the nonprofit role in the formulation of public policies.
Finally, the article examines the key challenges in government–nonprofit cooper-
ation in the provision of human services and the lessons the French experience
might hold for Russia and other similar countries.
Re´sume´ Cet article place le mode`le coope´ratif actuel des relations entre E´tat et
organisations a` but non lucratif en France dans un contexte historique par rapport au
passe´ e´tatiste du pays, et propose les implications que cette expe´rience peut avoir
pour d’autres pays qui partagent le cadre e´tatiste que la France, peut-eˆtre sous une
forme un peu diffe´rente, repre´sente e´galement. Pour ce faire, l’e´tude examine tout
d’abord la forme actuelle du secteur a` but non lucratif franc¸ais ainsi que
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l’importante porte´e et la structure du soutien du gouvernement pour les prestations
existantes de services sociaux des organisations a` but non lucratif. Puis, il examine
le contexte historique de´favorable d’ou` sont issus les services actuels et l’ensemble
des modifications qui ont finalement conduit au mode`le actuel de cette vaste
coope´ration entre le gouvernement et les organisations a` but non lucratif. Dans ce
contexte, une troisie`me partie se penche ensuite davantage sur les outils d’action
que les pouvoirs publics franc¸ais apportent pour servir leurs relations avec les
organisations a` but non lucratif, les avantages et les inconve´nients de chacun et le
roˆle du secteur a` but non lucratif dans la formulation des politiques publiques. Enfin,
l’article examine les principaux enjeux de cette coope´ration pour la fourniture des
services sociaux et les lec¸ons que l’expe´rience franc¸aise pourrait rece´ler pour la
Russie et d’autres pays similaires.
Zusammenfassung Dieser Beitrag bringt die gegenwa¨rtigen kooperativen
Beziehungen zwischen dem Staat und dem gemeinnu¨tzigen Bereich in Frankreich in
den historischen Kontext vor dem Hintergrund der dirigistischen Vergangenheit des
Landes und pra¨sentiert die Implikationen, die diese Erfahrung fu¨r andere La¨nder
haben kann, welche einen dirigistischen Hintergrund wie Frankreich, wenn auch in
einer etwas anderen Form, teilen. Dazu wird zuna¨chst die derzeitige Form des
franzo¨sischen gemeinnu¨tzigen Sektors und die substanzielle Reichweite und
Struktur der staatlichen Unterstu¨tzung der vorhandenen Bereitstellung sozialer
Dienstleistungen durch den gemeinnu¨tzigen Sektor untersucht. Man betrachtet
sodann den ungu¨nstigen historischen Hintergrund, aus dem die gegenwa¨rtigen
Strukturen entstanden sind, sowie die Reihe von A¨nderungen, die letztendlich zu der
heute bestehenden ausgiebigen Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Regierung und dem
gemeinnu¨tzigen Sektor gefu¨hrt haben. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird im dritten Teil
auf die Handlungsinstrumente eingegangen, die die franzo¨sischen Regierungen in
ihre Beziehungen mit den gemeinnu¨tzigen Organisationen einsetzen, auf die Vor-
und Nachteile der einzelnen Instrumente sowie die Rolle des gemeinnu¨tzigen
Sektors bei der Gestaltung der o¨ffentlichen Politik. Abschließend untersucht der
Beitrag die wesentlichen Probleme bei der Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Regie-
rung und dem gemeinnu¨tzigen Sektor im Rahmen der Bereitstellung sozialer
Dienstleistungen sowie die Lektionen, die Frankreichs Erfahrungen fu¨r Russland
und andere vergleichbare La¨nder unter Umsta¨nden bereithalten.
Resumen El presente artı´culo situ´a en su contexto histo´rico el patro´n cooperativo
actual de las relaciones estado-organizaciones sin a´nimo de lucro en Francia frente
al pasado estatista del paı´s y sugiere las implicaciones que esta experiencia puede
tener para otros paı´ses que compartan los antecedentes estatistas que Francia, quiza´s
de una forma algo diferente, encarna tambie´n. Para hacer esto, el debate revisa en
primer lugar la forma actual del sector france´s de las organizaciones sin a´nimo de
lucro y el sustancial alcance y estructura del apoyo gubernamental a la entrega de
servicios sociales de las organizaciones sin a´nimo de lucro que existe. Despue´s,
examina los desfavorables antecedentes histo´ricos a partir de los cuales emergieron
los acuerdos actuales y el conjunto de cambios que llevaron finalmente al patro´n
existente de extensa cooperacio´n gobierno-organizaciones sin a´nimo de lucro.
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Frente a este telo´n de fondo, una tercera seccio´n analiza ma´s estrechamente las
herramientas de accio´n que los gobiernos franceses esta´n aplicando en sus rela-
ciones con las organizaciones sin a´nimo de lucro, las ventajas y desventajas de cada
una, y el papel de las organizaciones sin a´nimo de lucro en la formulacio´n de
polı´ticas pu´blicas. Finalmente, el artı´culo examina los desafı´os claves de la
cooperacio´n gobierno-organizaciones sin a´nimo de lucro en la provisio´n de servi-
cios sociales y las lecciones que la experiencia francesa podrı´a tener para Rusia y
otros paı´ses similares.
Keywords Nonprofit organizations  Welfare mix  Statism  Decentralization 
Human services
Introduction
The French nonprofit sector is large and growing. The number of nonprofit
organizations in 2012 was about 1.3 million, operating mainly in two unequal legal
statuses: 1,300,000 associations, and less than 2000 independent foundations. Most
of the associations are grassroots organizations run by volunteers, spread all over
France in a living social network. Nevertheless, the 160,000 nonprofit organizations
managed by paid staff still make the French nonprofit sector a major employer, with
10 % of private employment and 7.5 % of the country’s total full-time employment
(7.2 % in associations and 0.3 % in foundations). In addition, employment grew
twice as fast in the nonprofit sector than in the business and public sectors during the
last three decades (INSEE-CLAP 2012; Tchernonog 2013; De Laurens 2013;
Archambault et al. 2014).
Remarkably, but not well recognized, the emergence of this sizable nonprofit
sector is a relatively recent development in France, the product of a dramatic shift in
government policies initiated by the left-leaning government of Francois Mitterrand
in the early 1980s. These policies led to a significant decentralization of
governmental responsibilities, particularly in the human service field, and a
widespread pattern of local or regional government contracting with private
nonprofit organizations.1
Prior to this, and certainly prior to the 1960s, France was characterized by a
strong statist tradition dating back at least to the 1789 Revolution. Under this
tradition, nonprofit organizations were at first outlawed, and subsequently discour-
aged, as the embodiments of partial interests at odds with the general interest
represented by the democratic state. Consistent with this tradition, social welfare
services were considered to be the responsibility of the state alone and nonprofit
institutions were relegated to a secondary position at best.
The purpose of this article is to put the current pattern of state-nonprofit relations
in France into historical context and to suggest the implications this experience may
1 Three levels of elected local governments exist in France: the roughly 36,000 communes, or
municipalities; the 96 de´partements; and the 22 re´gions. Now the possibility of suppressing one level (the
department) and merging re´gions and communes is on the apolitical agenda to simplify the administration
and reduce its cost.
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have for other countries that share the statist background that France—perhaps in
somewhat different form—also embodies. To do so, the discussion first reviews the
current shape of the French nonprofit sector and the scope and structure of
government support of nonprofit human service delivery in France. We then
examine the unfavorable historical background out of which the current arrange-
ments emerged and the set of changes that ultimately led to the existing pattern of
extensive government–nonprofit cooperation in France. Against this background, a
third section will then look more closely at the tools of action French governments
are bringing to bear in their relations with nonprofits, and the advantages and
drawbacks each involves. Also of interest here will be the nonprofit role in the
formulation of public policies. Finally we examine the key challenges in
government–nonprofit cooperation in the provision of human services and conclude
with an outline of the features France may share with Russia.
The Current Situation: The Scope and Structure of Government
Support of Nonprofit Human Service Delivery in France
Overview
As outlined in Table 1, with 913,000 employees (746,000 FTE), social services is
by far the main component of the nonprofit sector in France (INSEE-CLAP 2012).
As shown in Table 2, the nonprofit sector is also the main provider of social
services, with 62 % of employment, putting it ahead of the public sector (28 %) and
Table 1 Nonprofit establishments with staff and nonprofit employment, by field, France, 2012
Field Nonprofit
establishments
with staff
Employee
headcounts
(thousands)
FTE
employees
(thousands)
% of
nonprofit
FTE
Social services 33,236 913 746 46.9
Education, training, and
research
20,698 338 287 18.1
Health 4656 173 147 9.2
Culture, arts, and
performances
57,428 110 95 6.0
Other sectors (including sports
and recreation) and n.e.c.
72,745 352 315 19.8
Total 188,763 1886 1590 100.0
Source INSEE-CLAP, Tableaux harmonise´s de l’ Economie sociale (2012)
Methodological note Nonprofit organizations include associations and foundations and the nonprofit
health and social establishments run by mutual societies (about 1300). Most nonprofit organizations have
only one establishment. According to an agreement between INSEE and CNCRES to define the scope of
social economy it does not include worship organizations, political parties, labor unions, and business and
trade unions despite their legal status is association
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the business sector (10 %) (CNCRES 2014). Other nonprofit providers of human
services follow far behind: health and education organizations are mainly public,
with nonprofit employment in these two fields accounting for only 11 and 18 % of
total employment, respectively2 (INSEE-CLAP 2012).
The following subsections examine the relative roles and financing of the
nonprofit sector in each of these components of the human service delivery system
in a bit more detail, with a special focus on the interaction between the nonprofit
sector and government at various levels.
Education and Research
Primary and secondary education is mainly public, except for the 18 % of its
employment that is in nonprofit schools. Associations under the inspiration of the
Catholic Church run 96 % of these private nonprofit schools; the balance are Jewish
or secular. The nonprofit schools are linked with the government by a contract
(contrat d’association) according to which the state checks the qualifications of the
teachers and pays them completely while local governments pay the administrative
staff and for the maintenance of the schools. The schools have to accept every child
regardless of his or her religion, but can expel some of them—they must follow the
same programs as the public schools—but their staff choose the teachers and the
Table 2 Structure of employment in human service delivery, and in the overall economy, by sectors,
France, 2011
Field Share of employment by sector Total (%)
Private nonprofit (%) Other private (%) Public (%)
Social services 62 10 28 100
Culture 27 37 36 100
Education 19 5 76 100
Health 12 23 65 100
Employment in the whole economy 7.5 67 25.5 100
Source INSEE-CLAP processed by CNCRES (2014)
Methodological note ‘‘Other private’’ includes cooperatives and mutuals, which are companies with
limited profit and democratic governance. Along with associations and foundations, these organizations
are components of the social economy (10.3 % of total employment). As INSEE-CLAP data include only
staffed organizations, the part of the public sector is overestimated in the field of health compared to
‘‘other private’’ because there are many self-employed in this field (doctors, independent nurses, etc.)
2 The statistical knowledge of the nonprofit sector was nearly non existent three decades ago
(Archambault 1984). The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project Phase 1 and 2 supplied
the first complete data for the benchmark years 1990 and 1995–2000 (Archambault 1997; Salamon et al.
1999). Then, other scholars made repetitive organization surveys (Tchernonog 2007, 2013) or built a
satellite account of nonprofit institutions (Kaminski 2006; Archambault and Kaminski 2009). It was only
in 2005 that INSEE, the French statistical office, decided to build annual empirical data on the social
economy and to launch a first survey on nonprofit institutions in 2014 (Archambault et al. 2010).
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pedagogy. One pupil out of five attends a private nonprofit school, but more in the
Western part of France. As the comparative data of the French Ministry of
Education show (Ministe`re de l’e´ducation nationale 2013), the results of the
nonprofit schools are on average better than those of the public schools now (but
that was not the case 20 years ago). This is due partly to their attraction of middle-
class children while public schools have a higher proportion of immigrants and
lower-class children, and partly to their smaller size and more innovative pedagogy.
Recently, some for-profit enterprises were created to follow up on pupils in
difficulty.
Tertiary education is public or quasi-public. Nearly all universities are public,
though they have gained increased autonomy over the last decade, but this
autonomy is relative and they do not control their resources—nearly 100 % of
which come from public funding. Public universities are nearly free of charge.
Business schools and a few engineering schools are run by the Chambers of
Commerce, which are quasi-public organizations. Standard businesses entered
recently into the field of tertiary education to prepare students for the most difficult
competitive exams and the selective courses of study, but they represent a tiny part
of the field. Given the high level of public funding in education, the fees are very
low in nonprofit primary and secondary schools (US$150–900 per year) and higher
in tertiary education (US$4000 to $8000 in business and engineering schools) but
lower than in the USA. The origin of income of private nonprofit education—grants
only, according to the number of pupils or students—is shown in Table 3.
Secondary education is the main part of the nonprofit sector in education with
16 % of the expense for education at that level, while primary and tertiary education
represent less than 10 % of the public funding of education. Table 3 shows that the
national government is the main funder by far at the two first levels, replaced by the
Chambers of commerce for tertiary education. The regions, departments, and
municipalities are also growing funders in the last decade, during which we can
observe a slight retrenchment on the part of the national state.
Table 3 Structure of funding of private nonprofit education by level and type of funder, France, 2012
Type of nonprofit
education organization
National
government
(%)
Local
governments
(%)
Other (family, enterprises,
Chambers of Commerce, etc.) (%)
Total
(%)
Primary education
(n = US$4.4 bn)
51.6 23.5 24.8 100.0
Secondary education
(n = US$11.5)
66.7 9.0 24.3 100.0
Tertiary education
(n = US$1.7 bn)
9.7 15.3 75.0 100.0
Total (n = US$17.6 bn) 100.0
Source Ministe`re de l’e´ducation nationale, DEPP (2013)
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In addition, and at the crossroads of education and culture, many quasi-school
associations supply music, dance, performing arts, sports, and other initiations to
culture to the students inside or outside the schools. They are partly funded by the
municipalities and partly by households. It is the same for adult education. The
nonprofits specializing in vocational or on-the-job training are funded through a
dedicated tax (taxe de formation professionnelle) paid mainly by the enterprises that
benefit from the training of their employees.
Culture, Arts, and Performances
A kind of division of labor is in place for the provision of arts, live performances,
and other services of culture among the government at all levels, for-profit
companies, and the nonprofit sector. The state and the local governments are in
charge of the preservation of the historical monuments, and they run the largest
museums, libraries, theatres, and concert halls either directly or through nonprofit
organizations. The for-profit sector delivers entertainment and the most popular
performances, such as concerts for the youth or bourgeois theatre. The nonprofit
sector is specialized in the democratization of high-level culture to youth, often in
partnership with schools, and to adults as well. It also runs small museums, libraries
of local interest, and cinema-clubs as well and multipurpose culture and arts
facilities owned by the government, such as the Maisons des Jeunes et de la Culture
or Maisons de la Culture. The income of nonprofit culture organizations comes
almost 52 % from earned income (membership dues, sales of tickets, etc.), 4 %
from corporate giving, and 44 % from public funding, mainly by the central
government, the regions, and the municipalities (Tchernonog 2013, p. 170).
Health
At the heart of the welfare state, the delivery of health services is more mixed than
education. Hospitals are mainly public and two smaller parts are nonprofit or
businesses, as shown in Table 4, but these two parts are declining.
Public and nonprofit hospitals are free of charge and paid directly by the French
social security system according to their activity. Private clinics are mainly funded
Table 4 Structure of hospital field, France, 2012
Percentage of hospitals (N = 2710) (%) Percentage of beds (N = 416,710) (%)
Public sector 35 63
Nonprofit sector 26 14
For-profit sector 38 23
Total 100 100
Source INSEE Tableaux de l’e´conomie franc¸aise, 2013
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by social security as a third party, but the patient has to pay a more or less important
part according the clinic’s comforts, the fame of the doctors, and so on.
Conversely, doctors and other professionals delivering health services outside the
hospitals are paid, at least initially, by their patients; they are mainly private, self-
employed individuals or they work in small standard enterprises, but they are highly
regulated by the state and the social security system, which mainly reimburse their
patients. Nonprofit hospitals and other human health activities represent 11 % of the
total delivery of health services. Nonprofit organizations are particularly active in
the fields of cancer, rehabilitation of every kind of handicap, and drug and alcohol
addiction treatment. All these specialties are labor-intensive.
Table 5 shows the structure of total funding of health services in France; it is not
very different for the public or private sector, and inside the private sector the
nonprofit part is not isolated. The compulsory health insurance of the social security
system is by far the main funder, followed by nonprofit mutuals and other nonprofit
insurance and then by the patient’s household. Commercial insurance corporations
play a small but growing role. The state pays for the long-term unemployed or
irregular immigrants not protected by the social security health insurance.
Social Services
The delivery of social services is the realm of mixed welfare and interdependence
between state, local governments, and social security, which pay for the services
and control them, and nonprofit organizations, which provide the bulk of the actual
delivery of services.
There is a kind of division of labor in the provision of social services: the
government gives money benefits to some parts of the population and provides basic
and standard services to the whole population, such as information on existing
social services. It also delivers the services linked to the standard governmental
functions of police and justice, such as running establishments for pre-delinquents
or juvenile delinquents, though in the last decade the management of these
establishments was partly contracted out to nonprofit organizations. The nonprofit
sector is in charge of services requiring labor-intensive follow-up, such as social
work activities without accommodation (SWAWA) intended for long-term
Table 5 Structure of funding of health services field, France, 2010
Funders (%) 2010
Social security 75.8
Central government (for the poorest) 1.2
Complementary insurance (%) of which 13.6
Mutuals and other nonprofit insurance (%) 10.0
For-profit insurance corporations (%) 3.6
Patients 9.4
Total 100
Source INSEE Tableaux de l’e´conomie franc¸aise (2013)
Voluntas
123
Author's personal copy
unemployed, frail persons, or minority groups. Nonprofit organizations run
residential care for the mentally or physically disabled, the homeless and other
persons in a situation of social exclusion, and, to a smaller extent, for the frail
elderly. The business sector targets the high-income groups, mostly in elderly care,
but its involvement in the social services field is lower than in health services. As
noted above, the nonprofit sector is the major provider of social services. Table 6
shows the picture at the subfield level.
Except for home care and sheltered workshops for the disabled, the size of
nonprofit establishments is smaller than the size of the public ones and therefore
they are friendlier and less bureaucratic. In the subfields of services for people with
disabilities, nonprofit organizations hold a quasi-monopoly, with well over 80 % of
the establishments and sizable majorities of the employees.
Public funding accounts for 61 % of the resources of nonprofit organizations in
the health and social service fields, as shown in Table 7.
To summarize, the situation with regard to the nonprofit delivery of social
services currently is similar to the one in place more than 15 years ago as the
following quotation from a prior study makes clear (additions in italics to update
empirical data):
The field of social services is characterized in France by a mixed structure,
which has favored the enormous growth in this field of the third sector. The
Johns Hopkins Comparative Project has shown that ‘‘social services’’… is by
far the major area of nonprofit involvement, in spite of the sustained expansion
of governmental provision. In 1990, this field accounted for 38.5 percent of
total third sector employment employing about 300,000 wage earners (47
percent and 910,000 employees in 2011). Nonprofit employment in this field
dominates employment in the area of social services 58 per cent of total
Table 6 Role of the nonprofit sector in the delivery of social services, by sub-field, France, 2011
Percentage of establishments
(%)
Percentage of FTE employees
(%)
Sheltered workshops 91.7 93.7
SWAWA for disabled children 90.6 91.7
Home care 58.6 75.7
SWAWA for disabled or elderly
adults
83.6 72.2
Residential care facilities 60.2 52.7
SWAWA for children or teenagers 62.2 52.4
Other social services 63.5 49.1
Day care for young children 50.9 44.2
Total nonprofit sector 62.1 60.3
Source INSEE-CLAP, processed by CNCRES (2014)
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employment (and 62 percent in 2011) and has almost doubled since 1980
(tripled since 1990) (Archambault and Boumendil 2002, p. 109).
Summary: The Relative Position of the Nonprofit Sector in Human Service
Delivery
As a conclusion to the description of the mixed provision of human services in
France, Table 2 above summarizes the relative positions of nonprofit organizations,
for-profit companies, and government agencies at all levels in the delivery of
various types of services, and in the economy as a whole.
As this table shows, with 7.5 % of overall French employment, the French
nonprofit sector accounts for 62 % of employment in social services, 27 % of
employment in culture and arts, and 19 % of employment in education. To be sure,
government agencies retain the lion’s share of both delivery and finance in the fields
of education and health, but a powerful mixed economy has emerged in the other
two fields—and particularly so in the field of social services—where a strong
pattern of government–nonprofit cooperation has emerged. Therefore, the following
parts of this chapter will focus particularly on this social services field, where the
government–nonprofit partnership is most clearly in evidence. The next part shows
how this government–nonprofit relationship evolved historically.
Table 7 Nature and origin of funding of nonprofit social service and health organizations, France, 2011
Nature and origin of
funding
Social and health service
organizations (%)
Humanitarian
charities (%)
Total staffed nonprofit
sector (%)
Private resources 39.0 30.0 46.0
Membership dues 1.8 2.8 8.7
Individual and corporate
giving
1.8 16.1 3.5
Payment of the client/
beneficiary
35.3 11.1 33.5
Public funding 61.0 70.0 54.0
Municipalities 7.5 8.3 10.9
Department 22.8 6.9 14.0
Region 0.5 6.7 3.9
State 15.3 14.1 12.7
European Union 0.1 6.0 1.3
Social security and other 15.0 48.9 11.5
Total 100 100 100
Source Tchernonog (2013)
Methodological note Social service and health are not separate; because of the aging of the population,
social residential care facilities are increasingly also serving as health providers. They welcome the whole
population while humanitarian charities work for the poorest. Total nonprofit sector does not include the
numerous smallest organizations with no staff
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Historical Background of the Welfare Mix
The French nonprofit sector dates back to the Middle Ages with two pillars: the
hospitals, asylums, schools, and other charities run by the Catholic Church and its
congregations; and the more urban and secular network of guilds and brotherhoods
organizing craftsmen and their employees. These two origins of nonprofit
organizations can be found in most European countries (Salamon and Anheier
1996). But while the French Monarchy unified the nation early by joining regions
through wars and marriages, many other European countries unified later; this is
why France was and still is, despite two Decentralization Acts in 1983 and 2003, a
centralized state while its European neighbors are really decentralized countries
where most of the decisions on education, social, and cultural fields are the
responsibility of local governments. This section outlines the main turning points of
the history of the French nonprofit sector and highlights two trends that have
strongly influenced its development: on the one hand, the systematic restrictions on
nonprofit organizations imposed by a centralized and interventionist state in the
wake of the French Revolution; and, on the other hand, the progressive
secularization of the nonprofit sector in an old Catholic country.
The French Revolution (1789–1799): A Great Break in the History
of the Nonprofit Sector
Before 1789, the French kings fought any form of local power or religious
minorities, such as Protestants and Jews. The kingdom of France adopted
Catholicism as the state religion. The Church was the main provider of human
services. Parishes and congregations were at the origin of the charities: relief to the
poor families and orphan defense and support; sick and elderly person care; and
schools and other education institutions. In addition, in the urban areas, the guilds
and the brotherhoods gave a beginning of social protection to the craftsmen and
their employees.
The French Revolution is the great break in the history of the nonprofit sector.
The new Republic, inspired by the philosopher Rousseau’s Contrat social, elevated
the general interest represented by the democratic state and was hostile to partial
interests represented by any form of association. Therefore, the Republic fought the
Ancient Regime nonprofit sector’s two pillars: first, it took issue with the guilds (and
the brotherhoods, their social and religious subsidiaries), as brakes to free enterprise
and fair competition. Reflecting this, in 1791 the guilds were outlawed with this
rationale: ‘‘No one shall be allowed to arouse in any citizen any kind of intermediate
interest and to separate him from the public weal through the medium of so-called
common interests’’ (Archambault 1997). Later, the struggle of the anticlerical
Republic against the Church, suspect of interfering in politics in favor of the
Monarchy, had important consequences for their charitable organizations—hospi-
tals and schools mainly—which were either closed or nationalized while the
Church’s property and real estate were seized. Instead, the government stated that
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the welfare of the population was the government’s responsibility, but this principle
would not be effectively implemented for 150 years.
The Second Turning Point: The Liberal Laws at the End of the 19th
Century
During the 19th century successive governments authorized some nonprofit
organizations, if they agreed with government policy, and some mutual societies
to alleviate the poverty of the urban working class, but they fought against the
emerging labor movement, the opposition’s political clubs, and some authorized
charitable organizations that were thought to hide the forbidden labor unions or
political opposition.
The liberal laws in the last years of the 19th century were the end of these
restrictions to the freedom of association: labor unions were authorized in 1884;
mutual societies in 1898; and all types of associations in 1901. The 1901 Law is the
consecration of the freedom of association and the legal framework for most
associations nowadays.3 It defines an association as a ‘‘contract according to which
two or more individuals permanently pool knowledge or activity with an aim other
than sharing profits.’’ When it has been created, an association may be declared.
Undeclared associations have no legal rights. Declared associations have only
limited legal rights—they are not allowed to own real estate except for their
operation or to receive legacies. The aim of this limited legal capacity was to
prevent the Church from passing off parishes or congregations as associations.
‘‘State-approved’’ associations—fewer than 2000 today, but the largest ones—have
a full legal capacity and can own real estate and receive legacies. They have to be
acknowledged by the Conseil d’Etat4 after a rather long and restrictive procedure.
The beginning of the 20th century thus marked a turning point: the nonprofit
sector was no longer illegal, though foundations had no specific legal status.
However, the growth of the nonprofit sector was very slow during the two World
Wars and the inter-war period despite the fact that it was very easy and costless to
create an association. And no government–nonprofit partnership appeared in this
first half of the century despite the beginning, in the 1930s, of a corporatist social
security system inspired by the German one.
The Beginning of a Partnership Between the Central Government
and the Nonprofit Sector After The Second World War
The welfare state really emerged after WWII, in the 1945–1955 period of
reconstruction. A new social security system, extended step by step to the whole
population, covered the main social risks: sickness, old age, family burden, and
unemployment. Social security delivered social benefits but no social services
supplied partially by the central and local governments. However, the state began to
3 In a country with an inflationary production of laws, there are few examples of laws over a century old.
4 Conseil d’Etat is the highest court for public law conflicts.
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support by grants and third party-payments private catholic schools5 and nonprofit
organizations delivering services to the disabled, the poor, and the elderly, and to
child day care under a regulation system described below.
The Church-based organizations progressively ceased to run welfare establish-
ments or services directly and the state or associations replaced them. This
secularization trend began during the French Revolution and ended by the mid-20th
century. In previously Catholic welfare establishments, paid staff replaced volunteer
nuns. This is why the French nonprofit sector is secular, except for Catholic schools,
contrasting with the pillarization system of its Northern neighbors (Salamon et al.
1999).
After the post-war period of reconstruction, the nonprofit sector entered a boom
period. In the 1950s, this associative boom was mainly the outcome of the effort of
health or social service organizations born in the inter-war period to achieve for
physically and mentally handicapped civilian persons the same benefits as were
provided for disabled veterans. These organizations then became the providers of
the quasi-totality of welfare services and residential care facilities when the
government began to support them financially.
During the 1960s new demands led to new opportunities for nonprofit
development. Thus, for example, the rise of working women created new needs
for child care that the government could not meet alone, and new forms of child
daycare were proposed by associated parents. Other nonprofits enhancing the
democratization of culture were encouraged by the government as well as
multipurpose associations disseminating high culture in a popular way to those
who missed this opportunity at school because they had to begin working early.
Further impetus for the emergence of nonprofits resulted from the student
uprisings in 1968. The youth criticized all forms of authority and especially statism,
state control, and the ‘‘consumption society.’’ A new spirit of individualism within
the baby-boom generation gave rise to new fields of advocacy among nonprofits:
feminism, birth control, environmental defense, aid to Third World countries,
defense of human rights, immigrant mainstreaming, and others. These ideological
trends influenced the delivery of human services as well.
From the 1960s on, with constant economic growth and demographic and socio-
cultural changes, civil society appeared to be more eager to initiate the provision of
diversified services to specific parts of the population. The 1960s and 1970s were
also a time of institutional and political debate, and of the emergence of laissez-faire
ideologies questioning the advantages of a state-centralized policy in every public
field. Paradoxically, these critics of the welfare state came mainly from some
socialist circles belonging to the so called ‘‘Second Left.’’ They denounced
centralization, the inefficiency and waste of public human services, the weight of
bureaucracy, and, most of all, the inadequacy of public procedures to cope with new
or evolving needs (Rosanvallon 1981, 1995 and 2006; Ullmann 1998).
5 The ‘‘school war’’ between Catholic and ‘‘without God’’ schools has indeed been constant in France
throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, but it has been declining since the 1960s when the Catholic
schools signed contracts with the State.
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The Mitterrand Years (1981–1995): An Accelerator for the Nonprofit
Sector
The ideas of the ‘‘Second Left’’ were implemented when the socialist government of
Mitterrand was elected in 1981.6 The decentralization acts passed in 1982–1983
redistributed the responsibilities between the national state and local governments.
New human service delivery activities and new resources were transferred to the
local governments. As local governments were not equipped to deliver human
services, and because the political philosophy had changed as well, local
governments contracted out the bulk of the services that they could not provide
directly. This gave rise to a significant expansion of local government–nonprofit
partnerships in the provision of a wide array of services targeted to particular groups
of the population.
This expansion of government–nonprofit cooperation was also fuelled by
growing social problems in the 1980s and into the 1990s. Included here was the
marked rise of unemployment, and especially the beginning of long-term
unemployment that led to the loss of social protections and to social exclusion. In
response, many new nonprofits were created to provide ‘‘insertion through work,’’
while other nonprofits advocated against racism and all kinds of gender, sexual
orientation, or ethnic discrimination. Along with the appearance of various ‘‘without
borders’’ professional groups such as Medecins sans frontieres, the result was a
surge in nonprofit formation. Between 1980 and 1985 alone, for example, the annual
creation of nonprofit organizations jumped from 30,000 in 1980 to 50,000 in 1985.
And this development continued into the new millennium with a surge in culture
associations, organizations designed to integrate youth and drop-outs through sports
and culture, and home care and other ‘‘proximity services’’ responding to the needs
of the growing elderly population.
In short, France has recently undergone a revolution of sorts in its social
philosophy. Until the 1980s, France remained in the grip of the French Revolution’s
‘‘Jacobin’’ philosophy holding that the national state held a monopoly on the
definition and pursuit of the public benefit, and that it, and it alone, was responsible
for delivering human services and ensuring that they were providing equally for the
whole population. With the passage of the decentralization laws and the growth of
government–nonprofit cooperation at the local level in the early 1980s, the political
discourse and the operational realities changed dramatically. By the mid-1980s and
beyond, little daylight was left between claims by politicians on the right that, as
Chirac famously stated, ‘‘[t]he state and the public authorities do not have a
monopoly of the public good,’’ and those on the left that, in Jospin’s famous words,
believed that ‘‘the state cannot do everything.’’
6 Pierre Mauroy and Michel Rocard, two Prime ministers of Pre´sident Mitterrand chaired two of these
‘‘Second Left’’ circles before 1981 (Loi cadre ESS 2014).
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The Tools of Action in Government–Nonprofit Relations
While the changes introduced in the 1980s opened new arenas of social welfare
policy and new modalities of operation, it hardly completely replaced the pre-
existing Jacobin system. Under the Decentralization Acts (1982–1983), new
activities and new resources were transferred to the local governments, but the core
Social Security system remained centrally operated. What is more, some significant
differences survived in the handling of different types of social services. Thus, for
example, residential establishments, even those run by nonprofit organizations, are
more or less quasi-public and are seen as such by the beneficiaries. Their level of
government financing is very high and they are heavily regulated by state
procedures. On the other hand, social work activities without accommodation
(SWAWA) have more diversified resources and less extensive regulation, and are
therefore more independent of the state.
Considerable diversity also surfaced in the tools of action deployed in
government–nonprofit relations. Some tools act on the supply of human services,
and therefore on the providers, while others on the demand, mainly by raising the
resources available to potential clients. Left wing governments prefer the first ones
and Right wing governments the latter ones. Because of the political alternation and
the tendency to add programs and laws without suppressing the existing ones,
supply-side and demand-side tools coexist in France and they will be examined with
the pros and cons of different stakeholders (Ascoli and Ranci 2002).
The Recent Shift from Grants to Contracts in a Context
of Neo-Managerialism
From the 1960s on, the general pattern in France in the field of human services is
one in which the state provides the standard and basic services directed toward the
entire population and nonprofit organizations cope with more specific social needs
or provide services to targeted populations (e.g., persons with disabilities, long-term
unemployed, homeless). The state at its different levels delegates to nonprofits the
delivery of personal and specialized services directed toward minority groups and
socially endangered populations, as well as responsibilities for responding to new,
less defined, and highly specialized social needs, especially those involving moral
support for socially disadvantaged populations and family relations. But the
government or the social security system almost always provide the bulk of
resources through grants and subsidies that vary in form according to the recipient.
Thus, for example, assistance is provided:
• As grants on an annual basis for culture organizations and small SWAWAs;
• On a contractual basis over several years for private nonprofit schools and large
SWAWAs;
• As third party payments by the health insurance component of the social security
system—though the basis of these payments changed in 2008 from annual grants
to pre-set payments determined by the social security based on the precise
medical procedures carried out (tarification a` l’activite´); and
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• Residential care facilities are paid by social security or the central government
on a per diem basis (number of residents 9 length of their stay in the facilities 9
price of a day of care). The per diem is negotiated every year between the two
partners to reflect the actual costs of the past year.
What are the advantages and drawbacks of grants and contracts for the respective
parties? For the nonprofit organizations, grants and subsidies, especially when they
cover several years, provide trust and security and the possibility to plan
development and to innovate. The main drawback is the absence of competition
and the risk of bureaucratization and resulting heavy overhead costs. For the central
and local governments, grants can be politically attractive since employees and
volunteers of nonprofit organizations delivering human services are also electors. In
addition, the costs of services delivered through nonprofit organizations are
generally lower than those directly provided by the state (Lanfranchi and Narcy
2008). Engaging nonprofit organizations is also a way to avoid expanding public
employment, which is already very high in France. The drawback for the
government is that it has no control over the results. In addition, recurrent or multi-
year grants may lead to unexpected public deficits. Also problematic have been
some false associations that were created by the Right and Left governments to
reroute public money into financing political campaigns.
In response to such drawbacks and scandals, the European Union has urged
countries to shift from outright grants to competitive contracts during the last
decade. Under this arrangement, the central or the local governments define the
quantity and the quality required in the delivery of a particular service and allocates
the resources to the lowest bidder. For the government, this is a way to prevent the
charge of favoritism or misuse of public money and to reduce the cost of human
services and therefore the public deficits. The drawback is the standardization of the
services, the lag between the tender and the actual supply of human services, and the
bureaucratic burden for the organizations that bid. Smaller nonprofit organizations
lack the qualified staff to fulfill the tender forms while the larger ones criticize this
‘‘Anglo-Saxon’’ process as reducing their initiative and innovation and making them
either subsidiaries of the public powers or businesses. In addition, this project-
oriented competition often does not finance organizational overhead costs.
Loans, Loans Guarantees, and Social Investment
Loans and loans guarantees are linked mainly with the capital expenditures of
nonprofit organizations—construction, rehabilitation, or renewal of residential
estate or other facilities—and not with current expenses.
Associations, as noted above, have significant limitations on their legal capacity.7
Nonprofits have limited access to equity capital due to their inability to share profits
with investors. Their access to borrowing in standard banks is uneasy with the
exception of cooperative banks. However, the Caisse des de´pots et consignations, a
quasi-public bank that gathers and invests the money on savings passbooks, and, to
7 This limited legal capacity will be replaced by a full capacity for public-interest nonprofit organizations
when the 2014 Law on Social and Solidarity Economy will be implemented.
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a lesser extent, receives legacies while waiting for their division between heirs, has
a specialized department to help nonprofit organizations and other social enterprises
generate capital. A minor role is to lend money to the organizations with cash
shortages to prevent bankruptcies. This department advises nonprofit organizations
in difficulty as well.
Loan guarantees are given either by the state, local governments, Caisse des
de´pots et Consignations, or foundations. The 2014 Law on Social and Solidarity
Economy will give nonprofit organizations acting for the public benefit an automatic
loan guarantee from the state.
Loans and loans guarantees are not used by the bulk of French nonprofits because
the smallest ones do not consider themselves as enterprises and prefer financing
their equipment from cash-flow. They behave like French households that are less in
debt than many of their European equivalents. However, large organizations behave
like enterprises. Lending to nonprofit organizations is therefore an emergent market
for banks, but the cooperative banks were first and they are eager to preserve their
market share.
Socially responsible investment and solidarity-based saving are more recent
tools, emerging during the last two decades. In France, socially responsible
investment refers to practice on the part of institutional investors such as the Caisse
des depots et Consignations or the cooperative banks, mutual societies, life-
insurance companies, or congregations, to select their shares in corporations not
firstly on their financial performance, but mainly on their social and environmental
impact. This includes both negative and positive screening. Solidarity-based saving
is collected by companies on employee savings,8 if the employee decides to devote
a percentage of this saving to a solidarity purpose, or by banks on dedicated
securities. These savings are then invested in social enterprises or in nonprofit
organizations. The saver can target one or several nonprofit organizations. This
solidarity finance, which relies on positive screening, has grown rapidly since 2008
because of the criticisms of the banks’ behavior in France and elsewhere. However,
according to representatives of Finasol,9 the French social investment umbrella
solidarity-based saving—more than 1 million savers and some US$7 billion in
2014—is only about 0.2 % of the very large French savings and therefore it may
have substantial room to grow in the near future.
Crowdfunding, which uses the Internet to match nonprofit organizations or social
enterprises with savers, is also an emergent tool.
Tax Expenditures
Associations and foundations are exempted in most cases from the three taxes on
businesses: tax on corporate profits; value added tax; and local property tax.
However, they do pay a payroll tax. To decide if an organization has to pay the three
8 The employee savings plans allow employees to be financially associated with the proper functioning of
their company and/or to constitute a savings by means of one. One third of employees choose enter into
such plans.
9 See http://www.finansol.org/ for more information about this organization.
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corporate taxes, the tax authority applies the following criteria in the following
order:
1. Is the presumed nonprofit organization really non-profit-distributing? If not, it is
taxed.
2. Is the organization in competition with standard businesses? If not, it is
exempted.
3. Is the organization providing the same ‘‘product’’ (or service) as standard
enterprises to the same ‘‘public’’ with the same ‘‘prices’’ and the same
‘‘publicity’’ (rule of the 4Ps)? If one of these Ps is different, the organization is
exempted.
Since the implementation of this rule in 1998, which followed long discussions
between the tax authority and the representatives of the nonprofit sector, there are no
longer claims of unfair competition by the business sector and the bulk of nonprofit
organizations are tax-exempted. In the field of human services, elderly homes and
some youth residential facilities are the only organizations to pay taxes.
Tax expenditures to enhance individual and corporate giving are very generous in
France. These tax expenditures have grown dramatically since 1996. The
organizations that are acting in defined public-benefit fields receive donations that
are eligible for the following tax exemptions:
• For contributions of donors to all nonprofit organizations: a credit against taxes
owed of 66 % of the donation, with a cap of 20 % of income. To enhance the
creation of foundations, the donation over the cap can be deducted over the
following five years.
• For contributions to foundations only, except corporate foundations: a tax credit
of 75 % of the donation against the property tax (Impoˆt sur la fortune) paid by
the wealthiest part of the population, with a cap of US$65,000.
• Legacies to public-interest nonprofit organizations are totally exempted from the
inheritance tax.
• Corporate giving, directly or through corporate foundations, receives a tax credit
of 60 % of the amount of the donation with a cap of 0.5 % of the turnover.
These tax expenditures are more efficient for corporate than for individual
donations. Despite the fact that, since 2009, the new alleviation of Impoˆt sur la
fortune has had great success, French individuals increased their generosity by the
exact increase in tax expenditure and their true generosity remains limited (Facq and
Landais 2009). However, the exemption of inheritance tax for contributions to
nonprofit organizations has been linked with more legacies in the last decade, and
since 2003 the creation of foundations has been more rapid than previously.
Corporations were more responsive to the growth of tax expenditures and they
created many corporate foundations that are new actors in the nonprofit landscape
(Archambault 2003).
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Vouchers or Equivalents
Vouchers are a way to increase the income of the client or beneficiary of a human
service. They are therefore tools on the demand side of the human services quasi-
markets, as opposed to the preceding tools acting on the providers, or the supply
side. In France, vouchers are given to the frail elderly and the disabled mainly to pay
for residential care, home care services, or specialized devices (Allocation
personnalise´e d’autonomie for the elderly; Allocation de compensation du handicap
for the disabled). These vouchers vary according to the income and the degree of
dependency of the elderly and the disabled. It is paid either directly to the person if
he/she stays at home, and can be used only to buy care services in the home, or to
the residential facility if the person is institutionalized. These vouchers are paid
partially by the state and mainly by the departement. Vouchers also pay for holiday
camps for children and their families (cheque vacances). These vouchers are a mix
of public money, corporate money of the employer, and savings of the household
itself.
In addition, fees for human services often vary according to family income as is
the case for day care of young children or holiday camps for youth.
The benefits of vouchers are mixed: on the one hand, a voucher gives to the client
the opportunity to choose his/her provider and therefore enhances competition
among the providers; on the other hand, if the person is mentally frail, the choice is
done by others and some embezzlement can happen.
Public Regulation
The large-scale delegation of responsibilities in the field of social services to
nonprofit organizations has been accompanied by various regulations related to the
creation, costs, and activities (standards of quality, qualification, and recruitment of
employees) of nonprofit establishments. This field is indeed one of the most
regulated areas of activity in France as nonprofit organizations are filling a public
‘‘social mission’’ (mission de service public).
Different kinds of procedures allow the state to establish general regulations in
this field:
• As part of the general social security scheme, social establishments are subjected
to a process of authorization, called habilitation, involving an a priori control of
their project and its feasibility, and then leading to state financing
(accre´ditation);
• The majority of the nonprofit organizations active in this field also have to
receive an agreement (agre´ment). The agreement is, first, a kind of official
recognition of the quality of activities performed in special fields; but overall
and very often, these activities are possible only if the organizations carrying
them out receive this agreement. This means that the organization has been
given a kind of monopoly by the state to perform certain state-authorized
activities that other organizations are prevented from carrying out, such as
residential care for the elderly. ‘‘Agreed organizations’’ receive a variety of
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advantages. They are entitled to automatic (and automatically renewed) access
to public funding covering almost all expenditures involved in running the
establishments, either through per-diem reimbursements or through global
grants. Global grants are distributed to establishments which are under the
responsibility of the state, and per-diem reimbursements are provided to
organizations supported through the social security system. Finally, the
agreement allows some associations to bring actions before court for causes
related to their aim—a very special exception to the French legal principle that
no one is allowed to advocate somebody else’s cause before a court.
In return for these advantages, however ‘‘agreed associations’’ must accept strict
avoidance of the conflicts of interest and financial solvency conditions. Similarly,
special statutes and by-laws have to be accepted by the membership and, in some
cases, members must accept Ministry designation of the President and some
members of the board. So, too, the books, the activity, and the general operation
come under the control of the state administration (Inspection ge´ne´rale des affaires
sociales, Cour des comptes). In short, the association becomes a kind of mixed
entity, half private and half part of the public administration. In other words, for
these residential care nonprofit organizations, the fundings are quite routinized, even
during financial crises; but on the other hand, these nonprofit organizations become
agents of the government (Archambault and Boumendil 2002).
The Nonprofit Role in Policy Formulation
Nonprofit organizations have recently played a leading role in the definition of
social policy in France where the attitude of the state has been that of letting the
existing organizations organize the field to restrict the costs, and then taking on the
funding responsibility. For that reason, one can assume that this field corresponds to
the ‘‘partnership type’’ of relationship between the state and nonprofit organizations,
defined by Salamon (1995). But the state always gives the final coherence to the
policy. By virtue of their role as implementers of social welfare programs, nonprofit
organization leaders acquire very specialized skills that the Government and the
Parliament cannot have because they are multipurpose—so a tight collaboration
helps. As noted below, this can range from virtual co-construction of a public policy
to the mere exercise of influence.
Co-construction of Public Policy: The Laws on the Disabled—1975, 2002,
2005
As noted above, in the 1960s, children and adults with disabilities were mainly
institutionalized in very specialized facilities created by their organizations. In the
1970s, after some claims of ill-treatment, the government decided to legislate. After
two years of discussion with the representatives of the two main organizations
(Association des paralyses de France for physical and UNAPEI for mentally
disabilities), a 1975 Law formulated the above described regulation on the facilities
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intended for the persons with disabilities. After the same consultation, a 2002 law
clarified the rights of persons with disabilities in a residential facility and in ordinary
life as well (a few years later the same rights were formulated for patients inside
hospitals). Finally, in 2005, the 1975 Law was revised in partnership with the same
nonprofit organizations: persons with disabilities were guaranteed a personal right to
compensation for a variety of dedicated human services (the above described
voucher Allocation de Compensation du handicap) in addition to a money
allowance (Allocation pour adulte handicape´) that all the persons with disabilities
receive.
Another example of the co-construction of policy between government and
nonprofits is the role that the main charities acting for the poorest played in the
development of the 1998 law on exclusion and its recent up-date. More recently,
there was a two-year long preliminary discussion of the law on Social and Solidary
Economy with the representatives of cooperatives, mutual societies, associations,
and foundations before the law was adopted in July 2014.
Increased Policy Experimentation
As a centralized country, France has a principle of equality on the whole territory
that makes it difficult to experiment with public policies on a part of the territory.
But this experimentation is possible through nonprofit organizations. The best
example is the Law guaranteeing a minimum income. Official passage of this law
followed a long-term de facto cooperation between nonprofit organizations and
public authorities, especially in employment policy and health and social activities.
Associations helped employment policy by running, with significant public
financing, job-training programs, especially for unskilled workers. From 1984 to
1987, nonprofit organizations involved in the poverty plans met with local
government officials and social housing managers to develop a more durable
poverty policy in the form of a guaranteed minimum income. In deprived industrial
areas, such as the Northeastern part of France, the third sector cooperated with local
government to provide help and income support to the unemployed new poor. The
Wresinski10 report, adopted in 1987, was the fruit of this experimentation and laid
the foundation for the draft of the 1988 minimum income for integration (RMI)
policy. The Wresinski report recommended the extension of local experiments of
minimum income with the participation of nonprofits to enable the poor to join the
mainstream and asked for ‘‘a tight collaboration between various partners engaged
in the fight against poverty.’’
More recently, we can also observe that the new ‘‘helped jobs’’ to fight youth
unemployment, emplois d’avenir, originated in nonprofit organizations before their
legal implementation—and now nonprofit organizations are explicitly identified as
potential employers for these new contracts. Another example is afforded by
associations working on immigration issues. In recent years, they have developed
10 Father Joseph Wresinski was the very charismatic founder of ATD-Quart-Monde, a charity fighting
extreme poverty in which the volunteers commit themselves to live several years where and how the poor
live.
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literacy and adult training programs, school help to the children of immigrants,
sports clubs and recreation clubs, Muslim activities, education and mutual help for
women, legal assistance, and aid for administrative problems. Local government
encouraged the creation of such nonprofit organizations with in-kind and financial
support when such organizations were nonexistent, and this pedagogic experimen-
tation was acknowledged by official diplomas.
Other Forms of Involvement of Nonprofit Organizations in the Definition
of Public Policies
Nonprofit organizations have also influenced public policy through other channels
as well. For example, some nonprofit leaders, such as Bernard Kouchner and Martin
Hirsch, became Ministers. Owing to their former experience, these civil society
leaders initiate laws in favor of the nonprofit sector—such as the 2010 law on the
civic service, which gives to a part of the unemployed youth the opportunity to
‘‘volunteer’’ from 6 months up to 2 years in a public-interest organization or public
agency and to be paid half the minimum wage by the state.
The High Council of Associative Life (Haut Conseil de la Vie Associative), a
body grouping high-level leaders of the large nonprofit organizations and
representatives of the concerned administrations, has to be consulted on every
law or decree having an impact on the nonprofit sector. The same kind of
consultation exists for the official statistical data on nonprofit organizations and
other social economy enterprises, a new statistical field for the French statistical
office (INSEE).
There are also regular consultations by the Parliament with actors and experts
from the nonprofit sector on how to improve existing and contemplated laws.
Nonprofits have also recently been collaborating with the administrations that fund
them to build the tools of evaluation of their actions and the public policies that
affect them. Finally, a Charter of reciprocal commitments was signed by 14
nonprofit leaders and 14 Ministers on the occasion of the centenary of the Law of
1901 on associations.11
Key Issues in Government–Nonprofit Cooperation in the Provision
of Human Services
Accountability and Transparency: Legal Obligations But no Efficient Public
Control
All nonprofit organizations, in principle, have to publish annual financial statements
and discuss them during the annual general meeting of their members. The board
also has to present a substantive report on the activity of the past year. These
documents have to be published on the organization’s website—but many
11 After the changing of the political majority in 2002, this Charter was not implemented. Recently, this
Charter was updated and declined by the regions.
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organizations do not do so, and many have no websites. For nonprofit organizations
with an income over US$198,000, the accounts must be checked by an external
certified auditor. For organizations funded by charitable donations, the accounts
must be presented according to a template showing how the donations are used and
the sources and origins of the contributed revenue. There is no ceiling on overhead
and fundraising costs or reserves, but these are key points for the control and
monitoring agencies whether public or private.
The public a posteriori control is done either according to the field of action of
the nonprofit organization (e.g., Inspection ge´ne´rale des affaires sociales for social
services, Inspection de l’e´ducation nationale for education services), or in a more
general way by a special public body, the Cour des comptes, and its regional
subsidiaries, the Chambres re´gionales des comptes. But the Cour des comptes
controls in depth only 3 or 4 large fundraising organizations each year and that is
why private for-profit or nonprofit organizations of control mushroom.
Consequences of the Shift from Grants to Contracts on the Traditional
Functions of Nonprofit Organizations
The recent appearance of bidding contracts has created a hard competition among
nonprofits and between nonprofits and businesses, especially in the fields of
retirement homes and home services. The competition among nonprofit organiza-
tions eliminates the smaller ones that have no time and no staff to fulfill the forms
and compete with success. The shift to contracts therefore leads to the concentration
of the nonprofit sector. This has some benefits in a country with so many small
organizations, but there are two risks: on the one hand, nonprofit organizations may
be confined to unprofitable activities, as the commercial companies cream the
market for the rich or the less disabled, and let the nonprofit organizations handle
the assistance to poor people; on the other hand, nonprofit organizations could be
tempted to select the solvent clients, or the powerful groups of clients, to the
detriment of equity. These risks of creaming exist in other fields and are worrisome
in a period of deep social exclusion and increased poverty (Archambault and
Boumendil 2002).
A new dilemma appears with the great recession beginning in 2008 in France.
The impact of the financial, economic, and social crisis on the French third sector is
very hard with a scissor effect: more social needs and poverty and less public
funding. During the 2008–2011 period, the reduction of grants and contracts paid by
the state was compensated by the regions, the de´partements, and the local
communities. But now the local governments no longer compensate the retrench-
ment of the state because all the levels of government have deficits. Donations
remain flat despite more generous tax incentives. Increasing fees and other
commercial resources contradicts the aim of the largest part of nonprofit
organizations. For the first time since WWII employment in the nonprofit sector
stopped growing in 2011 and 2013 (ACOSS 2014), and in some fields, such as
culture or home care, some nonprofit organizations began to go bankrupt. Will it be
the end of a success story?
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Advocacy or Bureaucracy?
Confronted with strong public regulations in terms of accountability and technicity,
nonprofit organizations asking for public money are subjected to a bureaucratic
isomorphism (Di Maggio and Powell 1983; Enjolras 1996). Some have become
professional organizations and rely less on volunteers. Financial dependency on
public financing can also be a source of inertia, as some of nonprofit organizations
have turned out to be as institutionalized and as rigid as the public bureaucracies.
Their capacity to react to new situations is sometimes low, and their advocacy role
is declining. But one has to say that there is no automatic link between the size of
public financing and the degree of autonomy of the nonprofit organization.
Once again, the evolution of the associations of people with disabilities can serve
as examples of the impact of these pressures. Although they were based on
advocacy and volunteer participation in the 1950s, the majority of nonprofit
organizations in this field are now quasi-public organizations, and their main
concerns are linked with management. There is today no tendency for the self-help
groups to increase their membership, as the rights of people with disabilities and
their interests are well protected. Moreover, the search for group identity, initially at
the root of these movements, now seems to have almost disappeared. Therefore, the
democratic base of these establishments is sometimes quite small. Because of the
decline of volunteer participation, and decrease in member attendance at general
meetings, these establishments have also become disconnected from their members
and sometimes feel at a distance from family preferences and users’ rights to the
detriment of equity (Bloch-Laine´ 2010; Laville 2010).
Roughly speaking, the provision of services is sometimes considered to be
inconsistent with the advocacy role by nonprofit leaders themselves; that is why we
generally observe a kind of specialization among nonprofit organizations—the
organizations managing residential facilities create some branches whose aim is
advocacy and nothing else. These advocacy organizations have their own ways of
financing, through donations and grants.
Stability or Innovation?
The innovation function of nonprofit organizations is linked to their capacity to
react rapidly to a changing environment and to afford non-bureaucratic solutions to
new social issues. Nonprofit organizations surface unmet needs that cannot be
addressed through the market and find ways to cope with them, as they are deeply
rooted in local communities. Nonprofits also have the capacity to approach
problems in a holistic fashion, contrary to the administrations, which compartmen-
talize policies: employment, income, health, social and family position, housing,
education, and skills. But innovation is often a characteristic of young associations,
and if they manage to obtain important public financing they become more
bureaucratic and less innovative.
Examples can be found in many fields: for example, ‘‘insertion enterprises’’
produce goods or services in sectors overlooked by businesses, and at the same time,
they supply temporary jobs and training to people in social difficulty, such as
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unskilled young people, potential or former delinquents, and drug addicts. These
associations participate in the public policies against social marginalization in the
town suburbs, but if the local governments are their unique client they behave as
businesses and became less innovative.
Once again, it is very important in the analysis of the role of nonprofit
organizations in terms of innovation to separate residential care facilities and the
other social services. The building-up of institutions has been both a source of
innovation and paralysis. There is now a tendency against institutionalization, which
is considered a way of imprisonment. These kinds of organizations limit innovation
because their main aim becomes to survive as an institution. Bloch-Laine´ (1994)
insisted on the ability of the association to be short-lived and therefore less
institutionalized and more able to give impetus for social change than public
agencies. This is all the more important as France is a very bureaucratic country.
Professionalization or Volunteering?
The early secularization of social services in France was accompanied by a
movement toward professionalization, which is still under way. Nearly all the
professional careers in the social service field began as volunteer activities. The first
social workers, before and during the first World War, were single, middle-class,
Catholic, volunteer women. After the war, the qualifications of these women were
acknowledged; they received social visibility, and new professions, professional
organizations, vocational education programs, and specific diplomas were created.
One of the most innovative roles of volunteering is indeed to initiate and experiment
with new types of jobs and to create new skills, especially relational skills, which
are becoming more and more important on the labor market. For instance, being a
former alcoholic, drug-addict, or prostitute qualifies the volunteer to fight against
these social diseases and assist the victims; of course, this kind of qualification is not
written in curriculum vitae for the labor market. Indeed, this role of prospecting new
jobs is essentially played by volunteers, and then by the wage earners of nonprofit
organizations. Thus, volunteer nurses and nuns became salaried nonprofit employ-
ees. But public financing is also partly responsible for this movement toward
professionalization, since it requires understanding of the financing processes,
preparation of regular reports, negotiation for the funds and so on. Finally, the
initiative for the creation of nonprofit organizations has also come sometimes from
professionals who wanted to create their own jobs.
Generally speaking, volunteers are now rarely involved in the management of
residential care establishments since agreements and contracts impose professional
skills. In these organizations, volunteer involvement is limited to participation on
the board of directors or to visiting the residents. But volunteers are still very active
in advocacy organizations or smaller organizations, such as those dealing with the
rare illnesses and defending research on these so-called ‘‘orphan diseases.’’ Three
quarters of the time of voluntary workers go to associations without paid staff
(Prouteau and Wolff 2004, 2013; Tchernonog 2013; Flahaut and Tabaries 2013).
But we cannot speak of the end of volunteerism, even in staffed nonprofit
organizations. Indeed, surveys show that volunteering and employment of
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professionals develop concomitantly in the field of health and social services; in
2011, the hours of volunteer work in these two fields represented about 25 % of total
volunteering in France, or about 266,000 FTE employees (Prouteau 2013). That is
much more than 20 years earlier—the ratio of volunteers to professionals is even
increasing. But volunteers are involved in management, co-ordination, contact with
the public powers, and representative activities as board or committee members in
large organizations, while they are more multipurpose in smaller organizations.
Conclusion
France shares with Russia a long-standing tradition of centralization and monopoly
of the government in the delivery of human services and in the definition of the
common good. However, since the 1960s, this monopoly was step by step eroded in
France by the growing difficulty to provide and finance more human services—
longer schooling, more training, more health care to a population living a longer
life, and multiple social services for ever more varied ‘‘social cases’’ and for a
population diversified by immigration. It was also challenged by the impossibility of
increasing the already too-high number of civil servants and other public
employees, the criticisms of the too-bureaucratic and sometimes inefficient public
services, and finally the necessity to decentralize the public powers to meet the more
common Western European pattern inside the European Union. That is why the
Jacobin tradition, deeply rooted in the French administration, was progressively
supplanted in a large part of the political parties and public opinion, giving rise,
among other things, to the an expanded pattern of government–nonprofit partner-
ship. This progressive privatization of the delivery of human services was more
oriented toward the nonprofit sector than the market because, at the same time, a
more educated population desired to cope with the new social issues with innovative
projects, and nonprofit organizations offered a convenient way to achieve this. The
volunteers and employees of the nonprofit sector also prefer this sector’s democratic
and participatory governance pattern over the very hierarchic governance inside the
public and business sectors. While far from perfect, the result is a productive
collaboration between government and nonprofit organizations that has generally
served the country well. As Russia and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe,
as well as farther east, confront similar challenges, they may therefore find in the
French experience some useful lessons that could be adapted to their own
circumstances.
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